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Before the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal evidence law was a
confusing conglomerate of common law and statutes. Much of this law
was ancient and of dubious merit. The Federal Rules were intended to
reform and then assemble in a single document all the significant aspects
of federal evidence law.1 The goal was to simplify that law, make its
content more certain and its application more uniform, efficient and fair.2
Nearly a generation after the Federal Rules were enacted and after
many thousands of decisions purporting to apply them, there is reason to
doubt the extent to which the Rules have achieved their goals. Of
course, measuring the success of the Rules is not easy. It is impossible to
"grade" the Rules by evaluating each trial and appellate application like
an answer to a multiple-choice exam. Many issues under the Rules do
not easily lend themselves to "objective test" treatment.' Moreover, the
Rules address an enormous number of issues. To completely review the
impact of every Rule would require a multi-volume treatise.4
However, a summary of the case law in one area of the Rules' cover-
age-witness competency and impeachment-is possible here. This sum-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975, University
of California at Los Angeles.
1. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7075; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7051; Diane Kiesel, Comment, One Person's Thoughts, Another Person's Acts: How the
Federal Circuit Courts Interpret the Hillman Doctrine, 33 CATH. U. L. Rv. 699, 699 (1984).
2. H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7075 (stating
that Rules represent milestone to better administration of justice in federal courts by providing
clear, precise and readily available rules for trial judges that will be uniformly applicable
throughout federal judicial system); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FED-
ERAL RULES Op EVIDENCE MANUAL 12 (1990) (stating that Rules' goals "are to provide
speedy, inexpensive and fair trials designed to reach the truth.").
3. Ironically, most evidence law professors, including the author, seem to prefer this
mode of testing students.
4. Since the author does not have to read bluebooks, he has had plenty of time to read the
cases and write about them. A more detailed analysis of the issues discussed in this Essay can
be found in 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE (1990), and in a forthcoming volume of that treatise.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
mary reveals some disturbing developments. In some instances, courts
have twisted or ignored the clear language of the Rules and continued to
apply old common law.' In other cases, courts have created new com-
mon law to address issues that fall within the scope of a Rule.' In still
other cases, courts have found discretion to decide admissibility where
the Rules set forth standards intended to limit discretion. Finally, in
many instances undefined terms or convoluted phraseology have led the
courts to ignore or completely misconstrue what the Rules say.8 In
short, these cases cast doubt on whether the Rules have achieved their
goals or even made much of a difference in the way courts deal with some
important issues.
After a discussion of a few examples, the reasons for these develop-
ments will be explored. That analysis will call into question the efficacy
of a codification of evidence law in the form taken by the Federal Rules.
Specifically, this Essay suggests that a pure common law approach to the
development of evidence law is preferable to rules that employ a balanc-
ing test or ambiguous language.
II. PROBLEMS WITH WITNESS COMPETENCY AND IMPEACHMENT IN
ARTICLE VI
A. Rule 601
Rule 601 sets the tone for Article VI of the Federal Rules and for
much of the modem law concerning witness competency and impeach-
ment. That Rule states that "[e]very person is competent to be a wit-
ness," subject to limited exceptions not pertinent here.9 The Rule
represents a significant departure from the traditional common law of
witness competency. In the words of the Advisory Committee, the Rule
effects a "general ground clearing," eliminating almost all the categories
of witness incompetency recognized at common law.1° The Advisory
Committee emphasized that the Rule eliminates all mental or moral
qualifications for testifying.1 Thus, Rule 601 converts the issues for-
merly addressed by the common law of witness competency into credibil-
ity questions to be resolved by the trier of fact.
Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of Rule 601, the federal
5. See infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
9. FED. R. EVID. 601.
10. FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note.
11. Id.
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courts have failed to take seriously the "ground clearing" terms of the
provision. Instead, the courts have concluded that the Rule leaves them
with the power to disqualify witnesses with limited mental or moral ca-
pacities.12 Decisions following the enactment of Rule 601 frequently as-
sume the existence of judicial power to conduct competency hearings
13
and psychiatric examinations to determine competency,14 both of which
the Rule had seemingly rendered obsolete. While a few courts have
taken the literal language of Rule 601 more seriously, most courts appar-
ently do not treat witness competency issues any differently than they did
before the enactment of Rule 601.1" As a consequence of ignoring the
clear language of Rule 601, courts have undermined the goal of making
competency determinations more certain and simple.
B. Rules 602 and 603
Some authorities have resurrected common law mental and moral
competency requirements in the guise of interpreting Rules 60216 and
603.17 Some courts read Rule 602 as imposing a mental capacity require-
ment, suggesting that witnesses lack personal knowledge unless they can
12. United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841
(1989) (recognizing that Rule 603 allows judge to exclude testimony if person unable to take or
comprehend oath or affirmation); see infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 863-64 (1st Cir. 1983); Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 865 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 384 (5th
Cir. June 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982); State v. Smith, 370 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1985); see also United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[A]
district judge has great latitude in the procedure he may follow in determining the competency
of a witness to testify."); United States v. Raineri, 91 F.R.D. 159, 163 (W.D. Wis. 1980)
("[T]he form of a competency inquiry should be left to the trial judge's discretion.").
14. See, e.g., Martino, 648 F.2d at 384; United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Haro, 573 F.2d 661, 665-66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851
(1978); United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
911 (1976).
15. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 601-
10 to 601-11 (1991) ("Thus the practice remains much as it has been in determining that the
witness meets minimum credibility standards."); see also United States v. Gomez, 807 F.2d
1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that trial judges have broad discretion to determine com-
petence of witnesses; failing to even acknowledge existence of Rule 601); Raineri, 91 F.R.D. at
163 (reducing Rule 601 to mere rebuttable presumption of competence); John E. B. Myers,
The Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287, 301, 303 (1986-87) ("While there
is only a handful of federal decisions dealing with Rule 601 and witness competence, the cases
that are available indicate that federal courts continue to draw upon common law principles of
competence.... [These] decisions reveal that when genuine competency issues arise, federal
courts tip their hats to Rule 601, and then move beyond its seemingly all-inclusive language to
discuss and rely upon common law principles of witness competence.").
16. FED. R. EVID. 602.
17. FED. R. EViD. 603.
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comprehend their observations to an extent that makes their testimony
trustworthy.1I Similarly, many courts establish a moral capacity require-
ment by concluding that the oath or affirmation requirement of Rule 603
cannot be satisfied unless the witness appreciates the nature of truth and
the duty to tell the truth. 9
On its face, Rule 602 does not justify excluding testimony on the
ground that a witness lacks the mental capacity to make testimony trust-
worthy. The Rule requires no more than that the trier of fact find there
is evidence "sufficient to support a finding" that the witness has personal
knowledge.20 This standard should be satisfied if a reasonable juror or
judge could believe that the witness perceived the matters testified to.
Based on the Rule's standard, it is up to the jury, not the judge, to decide
if the witness is trustworthy. Rule 603 likewise imposes no moral capac-
ity requirement. The Rule requires only that the witness perform the
mechanical act of taking an oath or affirmation in a form calculated to
awaken the witness's conscience and impress his or her mind with the
legal duty to tell the truth.21 Nothing in the Rule suggests that the wit-
ness must in fact have his or her conscience awakened and mind so im-
pressed. A member of the Advisory Committee reports that the
Committee specifically considered and rejected imposition of any stan-
dard of moial qualification.22 Further, in his testimony before Congress
18. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir.) ("[A] person might be
impaired to the point that he would not be able to satisfy the 'personal knowledge' requirement
of Rule 602."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841 (1989).
19. See, eg., United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 110-13 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that
witness may be disqualified if judge determines witness does not understand duty to testify
truthfully); United States v. Lightly, 677 F.2d 1027, 1028 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[E]very witness is
presumed competent to testify, . . . unless ... he does not understand the duty to testify
truthfully."). But see United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1979) (asserting
that language and legislative history of Rule 601 indicate common law incompetency law abol-
ished, thus eliminating need to evaluate mental capacity of witness for competency purposes);
United States v. Lemere, 16 M.J. 682, 686 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (stating that all witnesses are
competent under Rules 601 and 603; thus, child witness's agreement to tell truth and efforts to
impress upon witness her duty tO testify truthfully were sufficient even if efforts not entirely
successful and witness confused truth, falsity, reality and fantasy); United States v. Allen, 13
M.J. 597, 600 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (determining that preliminary questions put to child witness
calculated to awaken her conscience and impress upon her that she had to provide truthful
answers; witness competent to testify under Rules 601 and 603 regardless of whether questions
actually accomplished intended purpose).
20. FED. R. EVID. 602.
21. FED. R. EVID. 603.
22. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 15, at 603-06:
The question remains whether Rule 603 operates as a rule of competency au-
thorizing a judge to reject testimony because he regards the witness as inherently
untruthful.... [The Advisory Committee] rejected a standard of moral qualification
as unenforceable and argued that the main function of such a standard would be to
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in support of Rule 601, the Reporter for the Federal Rules made the
point that the very presence of the oath or affirmation requirement in
Rule 603 diminished the need for competency evaluations of the sort
conducted at common law.23 It is ironic then that Rule 603 has been
turned into a vehicle for undermining Rule 601's general statement that
every witness is competent.
C. The Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Recollection
These are not the only instances where the efficacy of Rule 601 has
been questionable. Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, dozens of appellate decisions have considered the competency of a
witness whose recollection has been refreshed through hypnosis.2' The
recent intensity of the debate on this subject is especially notable since
almost all cases2 and articles26 on the subject date from after enactment
impress witnesses with their duty to tell the truth, a function that could be accom-
plished more directly when administering the oath or affirmation required by Rule
603.
Id.
23. See HOUSE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of Edward W. Cleary),
reprinted in 3 JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, Doe. 11, at 95 (1980),
discussing Rule 603:
No mental or moral qualifications for witnesses are specified. (Rule 601)... The real
utility of voir dire examination in this area has been to impress upon the witness his
duty to tell the truth, and this function is served more directly and effectively by the
requirement that the oath or affirmation be administered in a form to awaken the
conscience of the witness and impress upon his mind his duty to testify truthfully
(Rule 603).
Id.
24. For this issue addressed in civil cases, see, for example, Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523
F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974);
Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); Jean E. Maess, Annotation, Fact that Wit-
ness Undergoes Hypnotic Examination As Affecting Admissability of Testimony in Civil Case, 31
A.L.R.4th 1239 (1984). For this issue addressed in criminal cases, see, for example, Greenfield
v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation,
Admissability of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
25. The first reported decision concerning the use of hypnosis for enhancement of a wit-
ness's memory was Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. 1968), cert denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969). As recently as 1980 one of the most prominent commentators in the area was able to
state: "Evidence textbooks and law journals have largely ignored hypnosis of witnesses as a
means of enhancing witness recall." Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of
Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 327 (1580) (citations
omitted).
26. See, eg., Eric M. Alderman & Joseph A. Barnette, Hypnosis on Trial: A Practical
Perspective on the Application of Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 5
(1982); James E. Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is it Competent?, 6
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of the Federal Rules. This is largely because most of the scientific litera-
ture concerning the reliability problems presented by hypnotically-re-
freshed recollection was published after enactment of the Rules.27 Thus,
this issue tests the Rules' ability to deal with new problems.
The use of hypnosis to refresh recollection appears to present a ques-
tion of witness competency. The essential difference between a rule of
competency and a rule of admissibility is that the former focuses on a
witness's characteristics while the latter focuses on characteristics of the
evidence. Objections to the use of hypnosis to refresh recollection flow
from a concern for the effects of suggestion, confabulation and overconfi-
dence on a witness. 28 This concern is especially acute, some experts
claim, because it is impossible to accurately detect the influence of such
effects on any given recollection of the witness.2 9 In other words, a rule
founded on such concern is based not on a judgment that specific testi-
mony is unreliable, but on the assumption that the witness is not a suffi-
ciently credible source of information to permit him or her to testify.
Thus, a rule that questions the propriety of refreshing recollection
through hypnosis is in fact a rule of competency, focusing on witnesses'
characteristics in a way reminiscent of traditional competency rules con-
cerning insane or drugged witnesses. Like the insane or drugged witness,
the witness who has been hypnotized to refresh his or her recollection is
arguably incompetent because the witness is unable to know what the
truth is.
30
The courts have taken various approaches to this question of compe-
tency. Some courts hold that the use of hypnosis to refresh recollection
does not render the witness incompetent, but is a factor bearing on credi-
bility.31 Other courts have held that the witness is per se incompetent to
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155 (1983); Diamond, supra note 25; Robert B. Faulk, Posthypnotic
Testimony--Witness Competency and the Fulcrum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 30 (1982); Lawrence Herman, The Use of Hypno-Induced Statements in Criminal Cases,
25 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1964); Ira Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnotically-
Induced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 927 (1983); Robert C. Perry,
The Trend Toward Exclusion of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-Has the Right Question
Been Asked?, 31 KAN. L. REV. 579 (1983); Robert S. Spector & Teree E. Foster, Admissibility
of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567 (1977).
27. Probably the most frequently cited authority is Martin T. Orne, The Use and Misuse of
Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311 (1979).
28. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 333-40.
29. Id.
30. State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 657 (Wash. 1984) (Stafford, J., concurring).
31. The Ninth Circuit has considered the issue more frequently than any other federal
court. It has consistently ruled that the use of hypnosis to refresh recollection does not render
the witness incompetent, but rather, presents a question of credibility for the trier of fact to
resolve. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
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testify as to any subject discussed while under hypnosis.32 Another
group of courts has held that the witness is incompetent to testify except
as to those matters the witness recalled prior to hypnosis.33 Yet another
group of courts admit the testimony if certain safeguards are present.34
Most federal courts apply a balancing approach, permitting the witness
to testify if the value of the testimony is reliable and outweighs the risks
presented by unreliable testimony.35
Consideration of Rule 601 has been almost entirely omitted in this
(1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974). Only a handful of other federal courts have
confronted the issue. Other federal decisions holding that the issue is one of credibility, not
competency, are United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (1lth Cir. 1983), and United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252,
281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
32. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 723 P.2d 1354, 1375, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
265, cert denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 177-78 (Pa. 1981); State v. Coe, 750 P.2d 208,
211 (Wash. 1988); see also Diamond, supra note 25 (favoring per se rule of exclusion).
33. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1295-96 (Ariz. 1982); Elli-
otte v. State, 515 A.2d 677, 681-82 (Del. 1986); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103, 105 (Haw.
1985); People v. Zayas, 510 N.E.2d 1125, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Strong v. State, 435
N.E.2d 969, 970-71 (Ind. 1982); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (Md. 1983); Common-
wealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1197-98 (Mass. 1983); People v. McIntosh, 376 N.W.2d
653, 657 (Mich. 1985); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 430-31 (Minn. 1982); State v.
Patterson, 331 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Neb. 1983); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495-96 (N.Y.
1983), cert denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989); State v. Peoples, 319 S.E.2d 177, 188 (N.C. 1984);
Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Common-
wealth v. Taylor, 439 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. 1982). One judge has referred to the cases adopting
this modified per se incompetent approach as representing an "emerging consensus." State v.
Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 760 (La. 1983) (Calogero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Those safeguards include: (1) a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of
hypnosis must conduct the session; (2) the professional conducting the hypnotic session should
be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense; (3)
any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the defense prior to
the hypnotic 'session must be recorded, either in writing or another suitable form; (4) before
inducing hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the
facts as the subject remembers them; (5) all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject
must be recorded; and (6) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any
phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post hypnotic inter-
view. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-97 (N.J. 1981); accord Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 91
(Fla. 1983); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d
246, 252 (N.M. 1981); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ohio 1984); State v. Adams, 418
N.W.2d 618, 623-24 (S.D. 1988).
35. Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1416 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034
(1989); McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.3. 944 (1987);
United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,, 483 U.S. 1023
(1987); Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 441 (4th Cir. 1986); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d
487, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors
Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); United States v.
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debate.3 6 The number and variety of common law approaches devised to
deal with this issue are a measure of the extent to which the goal of
uniformity has been frustrated by this omission. This failure of Rule 601
is in part attributable to the absence in the Federal Rules of a definition
of "competency" making clear the scope of that concept.
D. Rule 606(b)
Rule 606(b) is a good example of another sort of problem. That
Rule makes a juror incompetent to impeach a verdict.37 Rule 606(b) has
generated a significant amount of litigation, with courts applying con-
flicting readings of the Rule. 8 This problem is largely owing to the
Rule's confusing structure and language. Its first sentence contains
nearly one hundred words, nine of which are "or."' 39 Key terms, such as
Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694, 697
(S.D. Tex. 1983).
36. No federal decision in this area has used Rule 601 as a basis for decision. The court in
United States v. Valdez cited Rule 601 in passing but treated the issue as one of admissibility
controlled by Rule 403. 722 F.2d at 1201. In a decision rendered shortly after the Federal
Rules went into effect, the court in Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir.
1975), based its decision on a finding that the witness was competent but the court did not cite
Rule 601. See also Kimberlin, 805 F.2d at 217 n.3 ("We think the more logical approach to
the question is to determine whether the experience of hypnosis has rendered a witness incom-
petent to testify."). At least one federal court has squarely held Rule 601 is not applicable.
Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122. ("Quite simply, we do not view this issue as a competency
question but as an evidentiary problem within the control of the district court and governed by
federal law.").
Many decisions conclude that admissibility rules concerning scientific evidence should be
applied when considering the use of hypnotically-refreshed recollection. See, e.g., People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 723 P.2d 1354, 1375, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
860 (1982); Hughes, 453 N.E.2d at 496. Other cases conclude that the admissibility of testi-
mony produced by hypnotically-refreshed recollection is governed by the principles underlying
Rule 403. See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123; Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201-03. The two
approaches appear to be closely related. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska
1986) ("The Frye standard is essentially a 'prejudice-versus-probative value test,' similar to
Evidence Rule 403.").
Even if it is not absolutely clear that the use of hypnotically-refreshed recollection raises a
competency issue, the question is a close one. Thus, the extent to which the courts have ig-
nored Rule 601 in this area would still be remarkable.
37. FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
38. A good example is the United States Supreme Court's recent decision concerning Rule
606(b) in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). With four Justices dissenting, the
Court held that the Rule rendered jurors incompetent to testify that they and other jurors had
been under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the trial. Id. at 126-27. The decision
disappointed the expectations of the commentators. See 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTO-
PHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 289, at 143-44 (1979); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 15, 1 606[4], at 606-28 to 606-50.
39. On reading Rule 606(b), one is reminded of how those who proposed a Federal Rules
of Evidence regarded the condition of evidence law before the Rules: "What is lamented is
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exceptions permitting jurors to testify concerning "extraneous prejudicial
information" and "outside influence," are ambiguous and nowhere de-
fined. Courts have expended little effort to decipher the meaning of these
terms, often treating them as interchangeable or abandoning the lan-
guage of the Rule entirely in favor of the hybrid "extraneous influ-
ence."'  Thus, the Rule's goals of simplification and certainty are
frustrated by a combination of poor drafting and judicial unwillingness
or inability to address the problems thereby created.
E. Rule 608
Rule 608 also presents more than its share of interpretation and ap-
plication problems.4 The Rule purports to regulate the admissibility of
evidence offered to prove the witness's character for "truthfulness or un-
truthfulness."'42 The Rule plainly does not deal with evidence offered to
impeach on some other basis, such as bias, lack of capacity or contradic-
tion. Unfortunately, it is often unclear whether an item of evidence
merely undermines credibility in one of these ways or also impeaches the
witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 4 3 Where this is
unclear, many authorities claim that courts have discretion whether to
apply Rule 608."
This distends the notion of discretion, thereby conferring on the
courts power that the Rule withholds. Judicial discretion to decide ad-
missibility exists where the Rules fail to state an applicable standard.
The fact that the established standards may be vague or difficult to apply
their infinitesimal, meticulous, petty elaboration into a mass not capable of being perfectly
mastered and used by everyday judges and practitioners." THOMAS F. GREEN, JR., COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, RULES OF EVIDENCE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASI-
BILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS (1962), reprinted in 1 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 23, Doe. 4, at 42 (1980).
40. See, eg., United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1151 (1981); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S.
917 (1976).
41. Again, the drafters failed to define terms that are basic to determining the scope of the
Rule and the nature of admissible and inadmissible evidence. Among the basic terms that need
to be defined are "extrinsic evidence," "character" and "credibility."
42. FED. R. EVID. 608.
43. See, e.g., Outlaw v. United States, 81 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir. 1936) ("Whether
impeachment... by proof of contradictory statements constitutes... an attack on ... charac-
ter.., has been much debated.... [S]ometimes the contradictory statement appears to raise
only a question of memory or mistake, while under other circumstances it seems to indicate a
want of trustworthiness.").
44. E.g., EDWIN W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 49, at 117-18 (3d ed.
1984); 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 38, § 308, at 251; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 15, 608[08], at 608-67.
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does not mean the courts have discretion to ignore those standards. At
most the interpretation and application problems created by vague rules
mean the courts need some room to exercise judgment as to the meaning
of that language. Calling this discretion invites the courts to simply ig-
nore the standard and create their own standard or decide cases on an ad
hoc and standardless basis, thereby undermining the Rules' goals of uni-
formity and certainty.
F. Rule 609
Rule 609 poses similar problems. That provision permits the im-
peachment of a defendant in a criminal prosecution by evidence of a
prior felony conviction.45 The evidence is admissible only if the court
determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.46 In
some instances, the evidence is admissible only if its probative value
"substantially outweighs" prejudice.47 The language of the rule suggests
the burden is on the prosecution to show that probative value outweighs
any prejudice.
However, appellate courts generally defer to the trial court's deter-
mination if there is any way to rationalize the balance struck. 8 This
deference accorded to trial courts has been justified on the ground that
Rule 609 grants broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence.49 Some
courts have concluded that this discretionary power is so broad that trial
court balancing under Rule 609 is "virtually unreviewable."' 0
This overstates the discretion granted by the Rule. Because preju-
45. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Rule 609(a)(2) also permits impeachment by evidence of
convictions involving dishonesty or false statements. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
46. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
47. FED. R. EvID. 609(b) (requiring probative value to substantially outweigh prejudice
where conviction more than 10 years old).
48. See, eg., United States v. Brown, 784 F.2d 1033, 1039 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding
trial court's conclusion that probative value outweighed prejudice although apparently neither
trial nor appellate court considered prejudicial effects); United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574,
579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985) (stating that Rule 609(a)(1) requirements are
met so long as trial court states that it balanced probative value against prejudice); United
States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981) (holding
that since it was possible to conclude that probative value of conviction evidence outweighed
prejudice, "we cannot say the judge's ruling was an abuse of discretion"); United States v.
Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Trial judge's] balancing of the respective values
contemplated in Rule 609 at best was inarticulate, and at worst revealed that he misconceived
the purpose of the rule. However, the ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion, as
appropriate reasons could have been given for it."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
49. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1068 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[A]II [circuits]
agree that the ultimate standard of review under Rule 609(a)(1) is whether the district court
has abused its discretion.").
50. United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
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dice and probative value are complex concepts that are largely incom-
mensurable, it takes little effort to rationalize any result in cases where
the balance is even remotely close. The Rule's allocation of the burden of
proof has no function if appellate courts defer to the trial court whenever
its decision can be rationalized. Although it is true that balancing proba-
tive value against prejudice requires judgment, the exercise of this judg-
ment is limited by the Rule's allocation of the burden to the
prosecution.5" Balancing that is not affected by this limitation simply
rewrites the careful compromise of conflicting values reached by Con-
gress and embodied in Rule 609.52
III. REASONS FOR THESE PROBLEMS
The problems identified above cannot be lightly dismissed.53 Ignor-
ing the language of a Rule, recognizing discretion where it does not exist
or expanding discretion beyond the scope granted, creating new common
law or applying old common law in lieu of the Rules-these judicial acts
undermine the foundations of a code-based system of law. The mounds
of cases still trying to solve the problems of interpretation presented by
the Rules quickly dispel the notion that the problems described in this
Essay are rare or that the Rules simplified and made more certain the law
of evidence.
The question, then, is why do these problems arise? The answer lies
842 (1986); United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
51. See Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1063.
ETihe district court must carefully and thoughtfully consider the information before
it to determine if probativeness outweighs prejudice to the defendant. This balancing
must not become a ritual leading inexorably to admitting the prior conviction into
evidence.... [The burden is on the government to show that the probative value of a
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.
Id.; see also United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
Although appellate courts should not overturn evidentiary rulings of trial courts
based on the proper exercise of their discretion, it is a primary obligation of appellate
courts to insist that this discretion be exercised within the applicable framework of
legal rules. In some instances this framework may impose no standard at all or none
other than good faith and the avoidance of arbitrariness. In others it is more restric-
tive. The framework of Rule 609(a)(1) is one of the latter. Congress, after much
debate, created a framework in which, with respect to a defendant, the burden of
persuasion is placed upon the prosecution and a particular process of weighing is
required. Both we and the trial courts must respect that decision.
Id.
52. See Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1063 n.54 ("Once the balancing stage is reached, the nature
of the compromise reached by the Conference Committee precludes any presumption that
prior felony convictions should be admitted.").
53. The fact that this Essay makes no comment about Federal Rules of Evidence 610
through 615 should not be taken as a suggestion that the author believes that those Rules do
not present similar problems.
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in the nature of both the rulemakers and the judiciary. If any evidence
codification is to work, it must take into consideration the limitations of
those who are asked to write and apply it.
The problems described in this Essay are in part the fault of the
rulemakers themselves. 4 The Rules are frequently confusing, utilizing
undefined terms where meaning is not clear from context. Further,
rather than providing a clear rule regulating admissibility, the Rules re-
peatedly make reference to discretion and the weighing of probative
value against prejudicial impact. 5 As with the terms themselves, the
manner in which they might be balanced is left undefined. This virtually
invites the judiciary to assume an undisciplined, ad hoe approach to ap-
plying the Rules.
One reason for the rulemakers' performance is clear: rulemaking is
a political process, the lifeblood of which is compromise. While compro-
mise permits rules to be enacted, it frequently undermines clarity and
definitiveness. As a political institution it was impossible for Congress to
refrain from regarding the Rules in political terms. The Advisory Com-
mittee was frequently forced to permit politics to drive its efforts. The
alternative might have been rejection of the Rules.
Paradoxically, another reason for Congress's performance was sim-
ply lack of political interest. In explaining one of the drafting incongrui-
ties of the version of Rule 609 originally enacted, Justice Scalia observed
that the bill proposing the Federal Rules was "relatively inconsequential
legislation."'5 6 In other words, many of the Rules were insufficiently
political to merit more interest from Congress.
Finally, many of the instances of loose drafting and reliance on dis-
cretion found in the Rules are due to the nature of certain evidence is-
sues. Some issues present value conflicts that are not easily resolved.
Unable to state a definitive rule, the rulemakers equivocated with vague
language or left the issue to the courts' discretion. Rules 608 and 609 are
good examples of such value conflicts. The admission of character evi-
dence to impeach a witness promotes the value of accurate factfinding by
enabling the trier of fact to properly weigh the reliability of testimony. 7
On the other hand, such evidence might be misused by the trier of fact to
draw improper and unfairly prejudicial inferences.5 Balancing these val-
54. By "rulemakers," I mean both the evidence law experts who drafted the Rules and the
members of Congress that evaluated the proposed Rules and enacted them into law.
55. Eg., FED. R. EVID. 403, 412, 609(a)(1).
56. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. FED. R. EvID. 608(a) ("[T]he credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . ").
58. See FED. R. EvID. 609(a); H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1974
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ues produced two of the most confusing provisions in the Federal Rules.
Whatever the reasons for the rulemakers' failures, the impression
one takes away from reading the Rules is that they often appear closer to
a draft of general principles than a finished set of rules. Implicit in every
undefined term and convoluted clause is the hope that the courts will
finish the job of rulemaking.
However, trial courts are by their nature unable and unwilling to
rewrite this draft. The complexity of Rules like 606, 608 and 609 makes
thoughtful application at the trial level all but impossible. Trial courts
must resolve evidentiary issues quickly to keep from prolonging proceed-
ings that are often already tortuously cumbersome. Thus, where a Rule
does not define terms or state a clear standard for admissibility, trial
courts lack the time to analyze the policies and legislative history of the
rule to discover insight into its meaning. Trial lawyers could mitigate
this, but as a group they seem to lack the knowledge of evidence law
required to educate the judiciary. Further, the natural inclination of a
trial judge when faced with unclear rules and lawyers suggesting different
interpretations is to read discretion into vague language or fall back on
the familiar common law learned in law school.
Congress could have anticipated this judicial inclination to expand
and abuse the discretionary powers created by the Rules. Trial judges,
particularly those with lifetime tenure, are notorious for doing what they
want. Thus, it should not be surprising to learn that these judges will
take every opportunity presented by vague language and grant of discre-
tion to avoid the thrust of a rule. After all, evidence rules can be limits
on the powers of the trial judge, allocating power to attorneys and juries,
the very people whom a trial judge is hired to control.
Unlike trial judges, appellate judges are not pressured to make quick
rulings on evidence questions. However, there is an understandable re-
luctance to reverse, even where a careful analysis of a rule may indicate
the trial court erred. Appellate courts are mindful of the constraints
under which trial courts operate and are loathe to require retrials because
of evidence law errors. Thus, where the language of the rule permits,
appellate courts are inclined to justify the trial judge's decision on the
grounds of discretion. Where this is not possible, appellate courts can
avoid reversal by sailing the case into that Bermuda Triangle of legal
analysis, the Harmless Error Doctrine.59 The frequency with which this
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7084; S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7061.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("[A]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251-52
April 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
doctrine is invoked and the language of the Rules is stretched tells us
something important about the attitude of appellate judges. When Jus-
tice Scalia suggested that Congress regarded the Federal Rules as "rela-
tively inconsequential," ' he was also giving us a good look into how he
and many other appellate judges regard evidentiary issues. The infre-
quency with which the Supreme Court hears cases under the Federal
Rules of Evidence tends to confirm this suggestion. In short, an appel-
late court is generally not the place where evidence law will be properly
applied or developed. It must happen at the trial level.
IV. WHAT To Do
These observations call into question the efficacy of an evidence
code, at least in the form frequently taken by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. A successful codification must be based on a realistic notion of
the nature of trial judges: they do not wish to see their powers limited.
This suggests that rulemakers cannot rely on trial judges to fine-tune am-
biguous rules. Rather, rulemakers must keep rules short and simple.
Terms must be defined and ambiguity kept to a minimum. Rules must
establish limits from which the trial courts cannot escape. The trial
courts might actually grow to favor such rules because they can make the
job of judging easier.
Where precise rules cannot be written because of doctrinal and
political conflict, it makes sense to allow courts to develop common law
rather than force them to cope with rules difficult to fathom. 1 Where
rulemakers are unable to provide a clear statement of doctrine, codifica-
tion does not solve problems, it creates new ones. Judicial efforts to de-
velop doctrine are discouraged because judges are forced to conform to
language drafted to avoid rather than resolve issues. Further, courts can
justify a result by pointing to the Rule and the discretion it provides,
rather than pointing to policy or logic.
The risk inherent in giving courts this power is that they may abuse
it, leading to inconsistency, uncertainty and unfairness. After all, these
are the judicial abuses that made the Federal Rules necessary. Thus, it is
possible that abandoning evidence rules in favor of a common law ap-
proach could make worse the problems described in this Essay.
But this Essay does not suggest there should be no rules of evidence.
(1969) (asserting harmless error doctrine permits conviction to stand despite constitutional
error if court finds beyond reasonable doubt error did not affect outcome of case).
60. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. This is precisely what the Federal Rules do in connection with privileges. See FED. R.
EVID. 501.
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Rather, we should only have rules that can be stated simply and under-
standably. This is no more than saying we should only have those rules
with a chance of preventing abuse. Of course, as to the remaining issues
where courts could be given direct responsibility for developing law,
there would still be room for abuse. Judges would still have the inclina-
tion to assume that their powers are broad. But it makes sense to hope, if
not assume, that courts would act more responsibly when given more
responsibility. If the courts did not so act, evidence law will be no worse
off than it is now. But society may be better off because it would be clear
who is to blame.
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